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Conditional income transfers
and choice in social services:
Just more conditions and more
markets?
Terry Carney
Privatisation is not the only force re-sculpting the rights, power and
dignity of recipients of welfare in Australia. As predicted by Peter
Dwyer’s idea of the ‘conditional welfare state’ for social security (Dwyer
1998, 2004, 2008), Australian social security payments are becoming
more conditional, restricting individual choice (Carney 2011), whereas
welfare services are expanding consumer choice (Needham 2011) along
with greater reliance on market forces in service delivery. Drawing on
the examples of the increasing conditionalisation of social security and
the ‘personalisation’ of aged care in Australia, this chapter illustrates
this convergence towards a middle ground between respect for indi-
vidual choice and state paternalism and a rebalancing of the tension
between the state and markets.
Social policy writers have long observed that conditions on income
support payments can run from negligible, such as Britain’s early his-
tory of having, ‘but generally not applying’, a work test on the un-
employed (Wikeley 1989, p. 296), to very burdensome, as under con-
temporary ‘activation’ policies in many countries (Handler 2009, pp.
81–87). Changes in the degree and intensity of such conditions can
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be studied for their ‘disciplinary’ and ‘surveillance’ effects (Henman &
Adler 2001, 2003) or in terms of the political economy of welfare.1
Recent changes to the form of social security illustrate a move away
from reliance on the cash/electronic funds transfers toward ‘in-kind’
transfer schemes. Examples include longstanding ‘food stamps’ in the
United States (Tschoepe & Hindera 2001) and other recent voucher
schemes, such as the French experiment with low value vouchers (Dal-
longeville et al. 2010) and Australia’s Forrest Report proposal for a more
universal ‘healthy welfare’ card (Forrest 2014); utilisation of represen-
tative payee, or ‘nominee’, provisions enabling third parties to control
and spend welfare payments for people with reduced decision-mak-
ing capacity (Social Security [Administration] Act 1999 ‘S[A]A, 1999’, ss
44, 123A–123S; see also Creyke 1991; Komlos-Hrobsky 1989); and hy-
brid forms (Katz 2010), such as Australia’s ‘welfare quarantining’, which
limits what a proportion of a social security payment may be used to
purchase, or the method of payment, through the issue of a debit card
rather than cash (Billings 2011; Bielefeld 2014). All of these can be eval-
uated in terms of the impacts on recipient choice, dignity, human rights
and impacts on vulnerable populations (Billings 2011; Coven 2001; Ries
et al. 2004).
More recently, social policy writers have turned their attention to
questions of how welfare services are arranged and provided. Services
such as job-matching, or residential care of the aged, for example, were
initially configured as state-funded, state-delivered (job-matching) or
state-auspiced (aged care), and ‘state-standardised’ services. These
packages of services offered few real choices, either for unemployed
people (originally managed by a branch of government called the Com-
monwealth Employment Service), or for frail older people requiring
1 As Joel Handler (2009, p. 84) observes of the differences between US workfare
and EU activation or active labour market programs: ‘Activation and ALMP
[Active Labour Market Programs] are considered different from workfare. The
Europeans maintain that the idea behind ALMPs is that actively seeking work is
about rights and opportunities as opposed to the US-style workfare model that is
focused on duties and sanctions … ALMPs embrace a wide range of measures
from voluntary training, human capital development, employment and wage
subsidies, and job creation to compulsory work programs. There are combinations
of carrots and sticks. In contrast, US workfare lacks rewards/carrots and focuses
on job first and sanctions/sticks’.
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residential care. More recently, such policies have been criticised for
neglecting values of human choice and agency, for their alleged in-
efficiency and inflexibility, and for failing to recognise the diversity
and pluralism of modern society. New approaches to service delivery,
involving contracting out of state services for-profit companies or not-
for-profit agencies, and private arrangements, through measures such
as the individual budget and individual choice and engagement of ser-
vices, have come to the fore (see Meagher & Goodwin, this volume).
The various forms taken by such ‘new public management’ (NPM)
arrangements for delivery of welfare services in turn raise important
issues regarding distributional equity, transparency and public account-
ability, and outcomes for vulnerable populations.
This chapter steps slightly sideways from these debates to explore
an apparent ‘convergence’ towards new forms of social security and
social welfare provision whereby, to put it simply, income support is
growing ‘sticky tentacles’ that reduce individual lifestyle choices while
state services programs are being ‘hollowed out’ to make greater space
for consumer choice, under the rather elusive banner of ‘personalised
services’ (Needham 2011). The chapter opens by briefly mapping the
conceptual landscape being examined, focusing on the key concepts
‘conditional welfare’ and ‘welfare service choice’. Drawing on (mini-
mally updated) examples exant at the time the chapter was first written
in 2012, it then presents some Australian examples of a new paradigm
taking the place of the traditional welfare state characterised by un-
conditional cash social security transfers and standardised state-run
programs of social services. This ‘new paradigm’ is illustrated through a
discussion of the increasing conditionalisation of Australian social se-
curity and the increasing ‘personalisation’ of residential aged care. It is
tentatively argued in the final section that both trends can be attributed
to a recalibration of the welfare state. This recalibration centres on the
age-old tension between the state and the market and the search for the
elusive middle ground.
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What is meant by conditional welfare and social service ‘choice’?
Conditional income support
In the real world, all income support is conditional to some extent.
Even the as yet utopian idea of a guaranteed minimum income (‘nega-
tive income tax’) would be conditional on citizenship for qualification.
Classical European social insurance schemes have long tied entitlement
durations to the numbers of years of contributions, and may also now
impose conditions of ‘activation’ for people of workforce age/capacity.
Likewise in the case of taxpayer-funded social assistance schemes oper-
ating either as a safety net or as the primary social security system (as
in Australia), job search and residence requirements have long placed
‘conditions’ on receipt of payments. The origins of such conditions for
the able-bodied run deep into history, including the British Poor Laws
(Garraty 1978).
The intensification of conditions attached to workforce age pay-
ments across the developed world has been part of a conversion of
social security from a so-called passive ‘right’ into an ‘active’ reciprocal
bargain between recipients and the state, often now packaged under
‘welfare-to-work’ welfare reforms (Handler 2009; Larkin 2011). As
Martin Powell (2000, p. 47) explained of the once quite fashionable
Third Way policies of Tony Blair’s Britain, ‘[i]n short, the third way of
citizenship moves from “dutiless rights” towards “conditional welfare” ’.
While the convergence of welfare-to-work policies across countries
should not be overstated (Handler 2009, p. 88), there does appear to
be a trend toward increased targeting of income support to people
of working age and increased sanctions for non-compliance with new
conditions.
What is distinctive in Australia and other countries is the selective
imposition of additional conditions on certain groups of social security
recipients, such as the United Kingdom requiring participation in treat-
ment on the part of addicts (Harris 2010) or, in common with many
countries, extension of conditionality to disability payments (Patrick
2011) and, more recently, payments to sole parents. Australia’s tra-
jectory started with active policing of a work test on workforce age
payments, before intensifying with adoption of ‘work-fare’ (such as
‘work for the dole’ programs), or requirements to vaccinate children or
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take action to collect child support as a condition of certain family pay-
ments. This has culminated most recently in measures restricting the
way half or more of the amount of a welfare payment for an Indigenous
client is spent, ‘quarantining’ part of the money for food and essen-
tials (Billings 2010), an approach later extended to cover behaviours
such as child neglect or school truancy in selected regions (Hutchin-
son, Dickson & Chappell 2011).2 Although not pursued, in December
2008 a government white paper on homelessness (The road home) had
also flagged compulsory rent deductions for public tenants (Gilbert
2009, p. 13), in part based on British Third Way thinking about sup-
ported housing (Carr 2005). As was the case with supervisory ‘new
paternalist-inspired’ welfare reforms in the United States (Mead 1997),
such extended conditionality aims to change values or inculcate certain
behavioural standards in specific groups of ‘welfare dependent’ people.
Markets and ‘choice’ in welfare services
Choice and efficiency are the benefits claimed from application of mar-
kets to welfare, but welfare markets take many different forms and
often combine with other organisational configurations. As Ingo Bode
(2009, pp. 164–65) reminds us in On the road to welfare markets, or-
ganisational partnerships for the administration of social services are
not new: non-government agencies and non-profit organisations, local
government, unions and employers, advocacy and pressure groups,
professional organisations, and many others have long had a hand in
shaping and delivering social services around different parts of the
world (Bode 2009, p. 168). Co-payments for accessing a public good
like health or aged care, for instance, spread costs between the public
purse and private pockets, as well as curbing ‘unnecessary’ utilisation
2 School Enrolment and Attendance Measures trials were located at Mornington
Island and Doomadgee in north-west Queensland, and the suburb of Logan in
Brisbane. According to Terry Hutchinson and colleagues (2011, p. 107), at
February 2011 there were 82 suspensions of payment (79 for failure of children to
attend school, three for failure to enrol). From July 2012 quarantining expanded to
five regions (Logan and Rockhampton in Queensland, Bankstown in Sydney,
Greater Shepparton in Victoria and Playford in South Australia), and ‘financial
vulnerability’ joined child neglect as a basis for quarantining of between 50 and 70
percent of each payment (Billings 2011).
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through a compression of choice. Examples of this include patient co-
payments for medical consultations or drug prescriptions (Carney &
Ramia 2009; Sweeny 2009).
Bode’s focus is government pursuit of ‘some purposeful social pol-
icy objectives … by means of distinctive regulations’, through what
he terms ‘managed welfare markets’ (Bode 2009, p. 165 [emphasis in
original]). Often called ‘quasi-markets,’ these involve government con-
tracting with private providers for provisions of services, also referred
to as the purchaser–provider model (Wanna, Butcher & Freyens 2010,
Ch 5). The radical transformation of the state job placement service, the
Commonwealth Employment Service, into the dispersed network of
privately contracted employment services providers known as the Job
Network (now Jobs Services Australia) has been told extensively else-
where (Carney 2005; Carney & Ramia 2002a; Considine 2001; Consi-
dine, Lewis & O’Sullivan 2011) including most recently its implications
for non-state (civil society) providers (Wright, Marston & McDonald
2011). In a more heavily regulated form, the Australian residential aged
care arrangements discussed later in the chapter also already incorpo-
rate a purchaser–provider model.
Public subsidies rewarding private action, such as tax incentives for
buying additional private superannuation coverage, for their part serve
to shape individual choices within private markets (see Adam Stebbing’s
contribution to this volume), though Bode argues that neither co-pay-
ment nor subsidy models create a welfare market properly so-called.
Rather, for the purposes of the present chapter, Bode’s concept of a
subsidised welfare market is most pertinent. For Bode, these are char-
acterised by more interventionist controls and conditions; and what
he terms direct payments, including vouchers, enabling consumers to
choose and control the purchase of services such as for disability, per-
sonal care or other human services (Bode 2009, p. 166). As explained
later, this maps conceptually to Australia’s aged care (and disability) re-
forms of interest in this chapter.
In sum, the emergence of managed and subsidised welfare markets
have constituted a hollowing out of former state ‘template-delivered’ so-
cial services, ostensibly in the interests of greater consumer choice and
government efficiency. This has occurred in conjunction with a trend
towards greater conditionality of income support. This brief sketch of
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the territory being considered is perhaps better understood in light of
two recent Australian case studies.
Case studies of Australian conditionality in social security and
welfare services
Conditional social security through ‘quarantining’
Historically, all Australian social security, other than compulsory su-
perannuation, has taken the form of tax-funded social assistance. With
its history of a ‘workers welfare state’ constructed around a highly se-
lective and means-tested program covering all major life contingencies
(Carney 2002, 2006), Australia’s social security system until very re-
cently relied entirely on unrestricted cash transfers, combined with
concession cards3 qualifying holders for various ‘fringe’ benefits, such
as lower utility charges or transport fares.
However, in 2007, selected groups such as Indigenous communities
and neglectful parents were singled out by the former conservative
Howard government (1996–2011) for an authoritarian form of involun-
tary management of their welfare payments, as part of a suite of health,
education and other measures presented as being designed to tackle
coordination of school attendance or policies to regulate alcohol and
drug abuse and child protection (Goodwin 2011).4 While distantly sup-
ported by the government’s McClure Report on welfare reform (2000),
which favoured ‘bundling’ income with other needed supports, the
3 Such as the pensioner concession card or the seniors and (lower income)
healthcare cards: Social Security Act 1991 (Cwlth), Chapter 2A, Part 2A. 1. These
cards qualify holders for certain advantages such as lower caps on charges for
pharmaceutical prescriptions, and state and territory governments which for
convenience choose to direct transport, utility and other concessions to the aged
or low-income groups to card holders.
4 These reforms have their origins in the Aurukun ‘community justice
agreements’ and the wider knitting of education, health, housing and income
support (Hatami 2006, p. 27), and the ‘mutual responsibility agreements’
(McCausland & Levy 2006) developed for 100 or so Indigenous health, housing
and other programs when the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC) was abolished in 2004 (Anderson 2006).
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whole package of measures was highly paternalistic and redolent of
‘social control’ measures. So far as income support was concerned, a
new ‘income management’ regime was legislated, covering three dif-
ferent groups of people (Sutton 2008): (i) all citizens living in declared
(Indigenous) geographic areas (essentially confined to the Northern
Territory); (ii) individual Australians anywhere in Australia selected for
income management due to concerns about child protection, school
enrolment or truancy; and (iii) those Indigenous citizens living in
Queensland, individually selected for income management after a hear-
ing by the Family Relations Commission, a new state body with mem-
bership from Indigenous communities (S(A)A, 1999: s123TA). In the
Northern Territory alone, as at June 2008, there were ‘over 13,300 in-
dividuals’ subject to the scheme; covering ‘53 communities within pre-
scribed areas and in 46 town camps located in major centres’ (Aus-
tralian Government 2008).
The legislation provides for half or more of payments to be received
in the form of a ‘voucher’ akin to a food stamp (in practice 50 to 70
percent of the payment) and the remainder in cash, with the restricted
‘basics card’ portion confined to paying for ‘priority needs’ as defined
(such as food, clothing, housing etcetera), and unable to be spent on
‘excluded items’ (such as alcohol, gambling, tobacco and pornogra-
phy). The scheme was expanded late in the term of the Gillard Labor
government to include non-Indigenous citizens and by including ad-
ditional behavioural conduct (such as child protection or addictions),
and indicators of individual vulnerability (teenage mothers5 and jobless
families6), piloted in regions with a high population incidence of such
5 When the youngest child reaches six months of age, a Centrelink information
interview explains ‘what they will be required to do … once their youngest child
turns one, including the services and assistance that they can access’. This includes
‘developing a participation plan’. Plans focus on reaching Year 12 or equivalent and
‘getting good early health and education outcomes for their children’. Parents need
to agree to comply with the plan. They are supported by a range of extra services in
these locations.
6 Trial participants were obliged to satisfy certain requirements. Failure to attend
appointments/workshops without a reasonable excuse, including to discuss an
Employment Pathway Plan, or failure to sign a plan, led to suspension of payments
until attendance at a rescheduled appointment/workshop releases payment (with
full back pay). Under ongoing versions of these sanctions, advice of a reasonable
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indicators. While the sanctions of loss of payments for some of these
new groups are less punitive (for example, for teenage mothers) than
for other workforce age payments for which recipients are subject to
participation plans (Employment Pathway Plans) and/or quarantining,
intensive case management contacts are still required for all, leaving
such people vulnerable to loss of income for failure to co-operate with
more active engagement.7
These measures can be viewed in a positive light as designed to
tackle the more entrenched pockets of disadvantage, in accordance with
contemporary thinking about how to shape a social inclusion agenda.
However, from a more critical standpoint they remain problematic on
both human rights (discrimination in the provision of welfare) and
efficacy grounds (Billings 2010), despite being broadened beyond the
Indigenous community (Billings 2011). Choice rights of some recipi-
ents are still being compromised in the interests of ill-defined broader
welfare objectives, and clients’ power and dignity are diminished.
The predicate here is that lack of employment or other conditions
of welfare dependency for individuals or their families (such as a focus
on child neglect or addictions) not only can be attributed to individual
rather than external structural factors (problematic in itself), but also
that the individual retains sufficient agency or choice over behaviour for
it to be ethical to utilise loss of benefit payments or other sanctions to
alter that behaviour. Behaviours such as gambling or addiction (both
included on the list of prohibited expenditures) are just two of those
which fail this test (Macdonald et al. 2001). Both are well recognised
excuse avoids suspension, but failure to attend rescheduled appointments/
workshops may again trigger suspension. Plans may include activities that focus
on the health, wellbeing and education of the child and the education of the
parent, as an alternative to looking for work, but will not include compulsory
requirements to place children into childcare or to look for or accept work. Where
activities are voluntarily included in the plan, and cannot subsequently be met, the
plan must be renegotiated. Parents in the teenage parent trial failing to comply
with activities in their plan could have their income support suspended until they
provide evidence of participation, but jobless family trial participants were exempt
from this.
7 Centrelink states that neither ‘sanctions’ nor ‘debts’ are incurred for failure of
jobless families to comply with activities of their Employment Pathway Plan, ‘but
other sanctions such as more frequent interviews with Centrelink and suspension
of income support will apply’.
11 Conditional income transfers and choice in social services
349
as having medical or learned components necessitating often lengthy
treatment programs, and thus are not responsive to simplistic moral
notions of ‘deciding’ not to gamble or drink. That is not to say that ma-
jor benefits might not accrue to the dependants of the person (for whom
money otherwise devoted to the grog will be available for food and ne-
cessities), but however worthy as an objective, this does not validate the
assumption for quarantining the income support of the individual re-
cipient.
A different narrative unfolds in the next case study, analysing ex-
pansion of choice in welfare services for the aged requiring residential
care.
Easing conditional social services for the aged in Australia
Australia’s model of residential care is a mixed model, reliant on for-
profit or not-for-profit providers, funded through a combination of
means-tested elements along with universal characteristics, akin to
schemes found in Austria and France (Productivity Commission 2011a,
vol. 2, p. 22, Appendix D).
Residential aged care is a small sub-set of Australian aged care ser-
vices, accounting for approximately 220,000 people at any one time,
with around 60,000 each year accessing respite care (see detailed elabo-
ration in Productivity Commission 2011b, p. 11, pp. 15–16). More than
nine in 10 (92 percent) of older Australians live in private residences
(with family or alone). Approximately 2.3 million people provide some
informal care of the aged, a proportion of whom qualify for income
support, a carer allowance or carer payment.8
8 Carer payment, paid at effectively the pension rate ($776.70 per fortnight single
from September 2014), requires a high minimum objective rating score under an
objective rating instrument regarding the needs of the person cared for (under the
Adult Disability Assessment Tool, ‘ADAT’), care in a private home, and ‘constant
care’ (broadly interpreted as care equivalent to a full time job): s 198; Re Del
Vecchio and Secretary DFaCSIA [2007] AATA 1145, and Re Confidential and
Secretary DFHCSIA [2010] AATA 551. Carer allowance, paid at a low rate ($121.70
per fortnight in September 2014) also is available only on the basis of a minimum
ADAT score, must be provided daily in a private home, and also must be for at
least 20 hours a week where the person cared for lives elsewhere in another private
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Government involvement in Australian residential aged care
arrangements began with capital funding of non-government providers
in the mid-1950s, followed by payment of ‘nursing home benefits’ in
1963. Market failure as ‘for-profit’ providers replaced not-for-profit (of-
ten religious) providers from the 1970s (Carney 1997; Carney & Hanks
1986, pp. 204–21) led to united political action to regulate the quantity,
price and quality of residential care (Courtney, Minichiello & Waite
1997; Productivity Commission 2011b, Appendix E). To correct for
concerns such as over-institutionalisation of the aged population, ineq-
uitable access, or poor standards of care, operators have been required
to be approved9 and obtain an allocation of places approved for each
geographic region, based on demographic indicators of expected need.
Entry into residential care has depended on obtaining a favourable
recommendation from multi-disciplinary ‘aged care assessment teams’
(ACAT), based on medical need and capacity for community care (Pro-
ductivity Commission 2011b, p. E15; Carney 2013a),10 though limited
places meant approval did not guarantee entry (Productivity Commis-
sion 2011a, vol. 1, pp. 104–11), and quality control through sanctioning
of unsatisfactory providers proved to be a rather crude and ineffective
quality assurance device (Ellis & Howe 2010).
The Productivity Commission’s inquiry report, Caring for older
Australians (2011a) recommended a radical restructure of these regula-
tory (and associated subsidy) arrangements in order to promote values
of individual ‘choice’ and generally create a more diversified market for
aged care services, mirroring similar trends discerned in provision of
disability services (Fisher et al. 2010). The commission pointed out that
home: Social Security Act 1991 (Cwlth) ss 954(1), 954A; Re Walsh and Secretary
DFaCS [2002] AATA 881.
9 Approval requires demonstrated compliance with ‘aged care principles’ and
other conditions under Part 2.1 of the Aged Care Act 1997 (Cwlth), along with the
‘certification’ process set out in Part 2.6, and quality accreditation standards in Part
4.1.
10 The national target ratio of aged care per 1,000 people aged over 70 be
achieved by June 2011 was set at 113, made up of 88 residential (evenly split
between high and low care) and 25 community-based predominantly low care
places (AIHW 2010, p. 15), and in June 2009 it stood at 110, though actual
provision in Western Australia, Queensland and the ACT was lower (AIHW 2010,
p. 16).
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the system struggled to meet demand for residential care, or diversify
to cater to the needs of residents’ expectations of being able to purchase
‘extras’ in order to better tailor care to their individual aspirations (Pro-
ductivity Commission 2011a, vol. 1, pp. 101–38). An overall perceived
lack of variety of service offerings underpinned its recommended shift
to a more flexible, more market-sensitive, model of delivery.
The Productivity Commission’s proposed package of reforms (Pro-
ductivity Commission 2011a, vol. 1, pp. xxiv–xcii) have since been
partially adopted by government (Australian Government 2012), in-
cluding abolition of the former distinction between high and low care
residential places, access to entry bonds and higher co-payment con-
tributions for all residents who can afford to pay and an ability for
facilities to charge for ‘extras’ (de Boer 2012). Accountability and regu-
latory agencies proposed by the commission were fully established: an
Aged Care Financing Authority (to set a price, which may or may not
reflect the cost of providing the service), an Aged Care Quality Agency
and an Aged Care Reform Implementation Council.
Of these, the personalisation of care to realise greater choice is the
issue of greatest interest for present purposes.
Personalisation of support
The idea of ‘personalisation of support’ through a more consumer-
directed, person-centred residential aged care system offering greater
choice (Productivity Commission 2011a, vol. 1, pp. 111–13), was
adopted in a very modest way by the Australian government.
The proposal for a single ‘gateway agency’ into all services, assess-
ing client needs (and to some extent preferences) regarding an overall
‘package’ of subsidised services, was adopted, though its scope was ini-
tially unclear (de Boer 2012). However, the idea of making a ‘choice’
between competing service packages offered by approved providers,
(Productivity Commission 2011a, vol. 2, pp. 166–74) is only to be tri-
alled (de Boer 2012). This was welcome recognition that choice can
be very problematic, especially for groups such as the frail aged, with
empirical studies showing that even Australia’s present system proves
very difficult to comprehend both for aged people and their families,
arguably overtaxing their capacity to make wise choices (Wilson, Set-
terlund & Tilse 2003). Even so, as public resourcing models switch
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from program-based funding to individualised cash funding alloca-
tions which can be spent as service users sees fit (for an Australian
review: Fisher et al. 2010, pp. 7–13), the complexity of the choices de-
manded of aged care recipients can only increase, along with workforce
pressures on providers (Baxter, Wilberforce & Glendinning 2011).
Since many users of residential aged care are frail or very elderly,
family or other carers will increasingly be in short supply, placing added
demands on the pool of potential substitute decision-makers appointed
under (now disfavoured) durable powers of attorney or public
guardianship. This will also challenge the viability of the ‘supported
decision-making’ approaches so strongly favoured under the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Carney 2012) and the
blueprint provided by the Australian Law Reform Commission (2014)
and the equivalent but largely untested brokerage/substitute decision-
making in other fields such as disability services (Tilse et al. 2003; Tilse
et al. 2005). By risking not being able to deliver the informal support
promised, this set of reforms arguably taxes the ability of civil society or
government systems to deliver equity and security to match the theoret-
ical expansion of ‘choice’ rights (Carney 2013b). Personal budgets, then,
are potentially empowering of individuals and their rights if soundly
implemented and well resourced but, if poorly implemented, also risk
short-changing citizens by detracting from the right to quality wel-
fare services, leaving vulnerable consumers open to exploitation such
as ‘elder abuse’ at worst or disregard of their wishes and values at best
(Carney & Beaupert 2013).
In assessing the advantages of personalised support, account must
also be taken of other counter forces pushing to re-homogenise what
markets offer. In an analysis of National Health Service (NHS) hospitals
in the United Kingdom, Patrick Brown and Mike Calnan (2010, p. 16)
argue that a pervasive ‘culture of targets and audits’ has accompanied
the widespread contracting out of services to third-party providers, un-
der the neoliberal philosophy of NPM. Among other casualties, clinical
trust and professionalism are undermined, while institutions experi-
ence ‘risk colonisation’, leading to bland or lowest common denomi-
nator provision of services (Brown & Calnan 2010, p. 15). Illustrative
examples in residential aged care can include food hygiene standards
precluding serving of soft-boiled eggs, or excessive incursions on the
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rights of aged residents to form sexual relationships (especially those
with mild dementia).
Explaining and theorising the trend towards conditional welfare
Various theoretical explanations might be suggested as drivers of this
convergence of choice and paternalism, a social policy trend which can
be read equivocally either as ‘beneficial’ (in the sense of building in-
dividual capacity and resilience) or conversely as rights-restricting and
disempowering, as discussed in this chapter. However, none of the the-
ories briefly outlined below are entirely convincing, leaving this writer
to suggest that pragmatic political trends may be more important in ex-
plaining Australian trends.
New governance?
A range of social policy commentators suggest we have shifted to a
new form of governance whereby various levels and types of public and
private decision-makers form flat structures of mutually interdepen-
dent networks, yielding consensual positions which achieve governance
through ‘soft law’ rather than Weberian command-and-control meth-
ods (see, for example, Héritier & Rhodes 2011; Lindsay & McQuaid
2009; Van Berkel 2010). One theoretical explanation of the trends re-
viewed in this chapter, then, is that they reflect these changing fashions
of governance. Paul Smyth (2008, p. 55), for instance, argues that we
are witnessing a new era of closer partnership between the various ‘pil-
lars’ of social policy. Whereas the former welfare state era policies either
promoted ‘citizen-based social development’ or adopted market-based
models which ‘sought to restrict welfare to the deserving few’, he con-
tends that ‘a new set of goals is forming around social investment in
an inclusive society in which all people have the opportunities to re-
alise their capabilities’, entailing such a new form of collaborative or
‘networked’ governance (see also Damgaard & Torfing 2010; Hemerijck
2009, p. 89; Wanna et al. 2010, pp. 289–95).
Certainly, the Australian convergence of the state-imposed control
of social security alongside expanded client-choice-autonomy settings
for social services can be partially explained by the rise of network gov-
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ernance, given its focus on consensual or lowest common denominator
elements, though some contest this as just another expression of neolib-
eralism (Davies 2009). But it is a partial explanation at best, as there
are many other forces at work in the ‘recalibration’ of the welfare set-
tlement, including: globalisation, demographic ageing, changed family
and work patterns, and so forth. Indeed, trends towards reconfiguring
the former welfare state to ‘create and develop welfare markets, that is
social welfare provision operated by market actors’ (Bode 2009, p. 162
[emphasis in original]), were noted over a decade ago as characteristic
of ‘third way’ policies (Lazar & Stoyko 1998, p. 22), as under quasi-mar-
kets like Australia’s Job Network.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberal confidence in markets is frequently advanced as a basis for
welfare reform (Beeson & Firth 1998; Carney & Ramia 2010; McClusky
2003). Although there are a range of arguments against ‘leaving social
provision to markets’ – including the view of the then Australian Trea-
sury Secretary Ken Henry, who pithily observed (2009, p. 10) ‘leaving
fairness solely to the market to determine should be unacceptable to
a civilised society’ – in its emphasis on individual choice and market
mechanisms, the Productivity Commission was undoubtedly strongly
influenced by neoliberal sentiments in framing its residential aged care
reform proposals.
While it is somewhat ironic that history suggests that adverse social
equity outcomes resulted from the mistakes of under- and mis-regula-
tion of publicly financed Australian aged care at its very inception in
the 1960s and 1970s (Carney & Hanks 1986, pp. 206–12), it is also true
that neoliberalism is by no means the only reason for the rising pop-
ularity of personalised welfare support. As Andrew Power, Janet Lord
and Allison deFranco explain in their detailed comparative study of
‘personalisation’ and empowerment reforms of disability services in the
United States, Canada, England, Northern Ireland, Sweden, France and
the Irish Republic, there are also strong philosophical, human rights
and theoretical justifications for the shift, including the influence of
ideas of active citizenship, the ‘developmental welfare state’ and obliga-
tions under international treaties such as the Convention on the Rights
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of Persons with Disabilities (Power, Lord & deFranco 2013, p. 8). Again,
this theory offers an incomplete explanation at best.
Remaking and restricting citizens?
The expansion and intensification ‘conditional’ social security brings
also offers itself to several interpretations in addition to those canvassed
already. Analyses suggestive of Foucaldian extended (and almost invisi-
ble) social control through technological ‘soft’ surveillance and mould-
ing of the lives of citizens clearly have some purchase in explaining the
trends in social security (Henman 2004; Henman & Adler 2001, 2003),
as also does the idea of construction of the ‘docile’ citizen (Hartman
2005). However, so far as conditional welfare is concerned, much of its
intellectual underpinnings can actually be traced to writing in the vein
of Lawrence Mead (Carney & Ramia 2002b; Mead 1997) and to the
somewhat simpler social policy idea that people cannot be re-empow-
ered as autonomous human agents without supervision and direction to
remake their values and attitudes in ways more congenial to society and
the domains of work (Green 2002; Macgregor 1999).
As has been shown in this chapter, the Australian experiment with
welfare quarantining does fit this narrative of use of state power to re-
make individual values, in that it openly and directly targets socially
dysfunctional behaviours such as excessive drinking, school absen-
teeism, child neglect and consumption of pornography (Billings 2010;
Bielefeld 2014). Likewise, the requirements imposed on addicts in the
United States and United Kingdom are another example of the ‘respon-
sibilisation’ agenda (Harris 2010). As John Chamberlain (2013, p. 100)
writes in a review of the extensive literature by authors such as Nikolas
Rose on the notion of the ‘enterprise self ’ and neoliberal governmen-
tality, its agenda of ‘dual advocacy of the self-regulating free individual
and the free market’ has assumed a ‘near-hegemonic position’. This self-
actualised or ‘enterprised self ’ is shaped and governed by a series of
‘rationalities’ such as those of individual activation (citizens as ‘entre-
preneurs of the self ’), competition, self-reliance and accountability for
actions and consumerist framing (Chamberlain 2013, pp. 98–100). Or
as Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller (2010) write specifically on welfare, it
can be portrayed as an exercise in the construction of citizens capable of
exercising ‘regulated freedom’. But once again, the material canvassed
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in this chapter also resonates with a more pragmatic and less theoretical
explanation.
Conclusion: No single or clear overarching narrative?
Convincing overarching narratives are hard to find for this convergence
around the hybrid forms of ‘managed-markets’ exemplified by condi-
tional welfare and the greater personalisation of social care services like
residential aged care.
At a purely descriptive level it is evident that two different images
of choice are in play. In conditional welfare the fungibility of cash
payments and the alleged lack of sufficient conditions or obligations
is constructed as failing to re-shape poor behavioural characteristics
(such as lack of a work ethic or irresponsible spending or addictions);
here paternalist corrective intervention is the virtue to be pursued.
With the personalisation of welfare services, choice itself is constructed
as a virtue which is being unreasonably compressed by rigid bureau-
cratic state service delivery systems or excessively detailed controls;
here paternalism is the vice to be tackled. As each sector moves from
polar extremes of comparatively untrammeled choice (as-of-right cash
transfers for social security) and paternalism (one-size-fits-all state-run
services), towards a rebalancing of choice and paternalism, it might be
argued that this degree of convergence is just a welcome pragmatic em-
brace of more nuanced and sophisticated policies.
On the other hand, as this chapter has shown, the theoretical jus-
tifications for the restriction of choice (quarantining) or its expansion
(personalised support) proved to be rather thin. Such recalibrations
thus risk falling victim to excessively zealous and sweeping adoptions
of new configurations without a sufficient evidence-based foundation
or subsequent critical evaluation of the impact of the policy change. For
example, currently popular narratives like ‘personalisation’ of welfare
conceal old dilemmas. Catherine Needham (2011, pp. 62–63) raises one
of the more pertinent to this chapter when she asks:
[H]ow do you make sense of your relationship to the state when you
are placed in control of a personal budget, and exhorted to strive for
self actualisation, while at the same time being subject to strictures to
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enter the labour market on whatever basic terms it is possible to get
a job?
Networked governance is another popular contemporary concept to
come into question for blurring important policy debates, including
from commentators such as Jonathan Davies (2009).
To take a contemporary policy example, it is therefore cautioned
that Australia should not rush too quickly into legislation replacing
substitute decision-making with ‘supported decision-making’ schemes.
Such reforms need to be well grounded in an evidence base and rigor-
ous evaluation of the quite distinctive (and limited) contributions able
to be made by law, formal policy or other normative civil society and
family processes. Otherwise, such reforms may fail to provide the in-
tended complementary assistance in the realisation of the objective of
‘personalisation of choice’ in services for vulnerable populations such
as people with a disability (Carney & Beaupert 2013). Identical conclu-
sions have been reached from a meta-review of international studies
(Kohn, Blumenthal & Campbell 2013). Similar warnings about the lack
of specificity of proposals have been levelled at ‘social inclusion’ pro-
grams, which Davies (2005, p. 23) earlier rather tartly characterised as:
[A] contract, in which the individual pledges to take responsibility
across the full spectrum of social life – from maintaining employa-
bility to maintaining a healthy life style. The state is re-shaped to bear
part of the risk that such responsible individuals face, but in ways
that minimise dependency and the social wage. The wealthy appear
to be largely exempt from any additional obligations.
Again, these debates have salience for Australia (Carney 2007).
One of the broader goals tapped by ideas of personalisation, net-
worked governance and social inclusion is greater responsiveness of
welfare systems to the variety of individual needs and capacities of con-
sumers and to the diversity of values and interests of modern society.
However, consistent with the aim of cultivation of ‘responsibilisation’ of
the individual, there are elements in all of these of a somewhat woolly
assumption of localised, deliberative democratic engagement in craft-
ing individual or collective policies within outer bounds set by the state;
a form of ‘guided self-regulation’. Of course, such policy configurations
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can bring important benefits despite these concerns; it all depends on
close examination of the detail of particular schemes, as demonstrated
by Power, Lord and deFranco’s international review of personalisation
programs (Power, Lord & deFranco 2013). But the public policy prob-
lem is that this detail – as illustrated by NPM and neoliberal governance
reforms – tends to be hidden further away from public scrutiny and ac-
countability than was the case under predecessor policy settings (Diller
2000; Gilman 2001).
The way forward cannot confidently be mapped fully at this stage.
Certainly, the trend towards market provision and conditional welfare
calls for creative thinking on how to reinstate respect for values of ac-
countability and transparency (Mashaw 2006; Mulgan 2006). However,
as Tara Melish (2010, pp. 56–60, 69ff) implies, this must surely also be
accompanied by rethinking the degree of ‘convergence’ that is appropri-
ate. While there is undoubtedly an intensifying trend under the Abbott
government both to make income support more conditional and to
inject greater choice in those service provision programs for which it
continues to accept responsibility for funding after any devolution to
the states and territories, the jury remains out on whether and to what
degree this is desirable. While both can be rationalised as being a prod-
uct of a common influence – such as in striving to realise the ‘ensuring’
state or Bode’s ‘subsidised welfare market’ – history may yet show that
the trend towards convergence between choice and paternalism was a
mere temporary coincidence in the workings of Australia’s democra-
tic polity. As this chapter reveals, both possibilities seemingly remain
open.
Legislation and cases
Aged Care Act 1997 (Cwlth)
Social Security Act 1991
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999
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